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1. INTRODUCTION
Save for limited flexibilities, such as those introduced by Arti-
cle XVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")
at the 1954-55 GATT Review Session, few options are left for poor
development-conscious members of the World Trade Organization
("WTO") that wish to nurture domestic industries in this era of in-
tense cross-border business competition.1  On the strength of
GATT Article XVIII, developing countries that are WTO Members
are allowed to advance the "infant-industry argument" 2 to back
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1 Following pressure from developing countries, the contracting parties to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") recognized the folly of ab-
solute trade rules and introduced additional flexibility with regard to GATT
obligations for developing countries for the first time at the GATT Review Session
held between 1954 and 1955. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Text of
the General Agreement in Force 1958, Nov. 1958, GATT B.I.S.D. (3rd) at 33 (1958)
[hereinafter GATT]. During this session, Article XVII was amended to make it
possible for developing countries that were experiencing problems with balance
of payments to hold consultations once every two years. Id. at 37. Further, on
more relaxed conditions, they were allowed to take measures deviating from their
GAT obligations for the promotion of a particular industry. Id. at 38. Collec-
tively, these amendments to Article XVIII gave birth to the concept of differential
treatment of developing countries. For a careful analysis of the involvement of
developing countries in the GATF, which also highlights the demands that led to
the convening of the GAT Review Session in 1954, see generally ROBERT E.
HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1987) (noting devel-
oping countries' effort to create new protective trade barriers for infant-industry
protection and to exert less pressure for reciprocal tariff concession negotiations).
2 In particular, Article XVIII, section C states:
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measures instituted to support particular fledgling industries. 3
With a limited scope for development in the multilateral trading
system and the recent decision in the European Communities -
Conditions for Granting Tariff Preferences, 4 which sounds the
death knell for the Generalized System of Preferences schemes by
some developed countries (i.e. the European Union and the United
States) as it allows them to offer non-reciprocal market access con-
cessions to developing countries, one could conclude that develop-
ing countries are hemmed in by the WTO and have little wiggle
room to engage in seemingly discriminatory but development-
oriented policies.5 However, given the scale and value of the gov-
If a contracting party coming within the scope of paragraph 4(a) of this
Article finds that governmental assistance is required to promote the es-
tablishment of a particular industry with a view to raising the general
standard of living of its people, but that no measure consistent with the
other provisions of this Agreement is practicable to achieve that objec-
tive, it may have recourse to the provisions and procedures set out in
this Section.
GATT, supra note 1, art. XVIII.
3 See Mehdi Shafaeddin, Mhat Did Frederick List Actually Say?: Some Clarifica-
tions on the Infant Industry Argument, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/OSG/DP/149 (Discussion Paper No. 149, 2000) (noting that
according to Frederick List, who originated the infant industry argument, trade
policy is not a panacea, rather, it is one element in his general theory of "produc-
tive power" (development); and noting further that industrial development also
requires a host of other socio-economic measures), available at http://
www.unctad.org/en/docs/dp-149.en.pdf. According to Shafaeddin, the infant
industry argument is not only still valid, if properly applied, but is at present even
more relevant, owing to recent technological changes in the organization of pro-
duction. Shafaeddin notes, however, that despite its demonstrable increase and
relevance, the means to achieving it have been restricted by international trade
rules. Id. at 20.
4 WTO Report on European Communities -Conditions for the Granting of
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003), available
at http://docsonline.wto.org. The panel ruling has been appealed, however.
European Communities Condition for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing
Countries: Notification of an Appeal by the European Communities under paragraph 4 of
Article 16 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes ("DSU"), WT/DS246/7 (Jan. 8, 2004), available at http://docsonline.
wto.org.
5 In a recent article, Professor Robert Howse of the University of Michigan
Law School has remarked that "[tihe panel ruling on India's challenge of the
European Community's generalized [sic] system of preferences will have vast im-
plications for the multilateral trading system, assuming it is not reversed on ap-
peal." Robert Howse, The Death of GSP? The Panel Ruling in the India-EC Dispute
Over Preferences for Drug Enforcement, BRIDGES, Jan. 2004, at 7, available at
http://www. ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/BRIDGES8-1.pdf (last visited Mar. 26,
2004). On GSP schemes in general, please see JUAN SANCHEZ ARNAU, THE
GENERALISED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (2002).
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ernment procurement process in most of these poor economies, it
remains one of the most direct ways governments have been able
to bolster and keep afloat some strategic sectors of the economy.
The government procurement process has served as an ideal tool
for state intervention in the economy, and has for this reason re-
mained "at the fringe of trade liberalization efforts." 6 According to
Sahaydachny and Don Wallace, "[t]raditionally [sic] preference for
domestic suppliers has dominated the government procurement
domain and more often than not insulated it from the pressures to
reduce or remove national barriers to entry in commerce."
7
Efforts by some developed countries, mainly those in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD"), culminated in the Agreement on Government Pro-
curement ("GATT GPA") upon the conclusion of the Tokyo Round
of trade negotiations in 1979. Subsequently, this agreement was
extensively revised during the Uruguay Round, which ended in
1994 with the establishment of the WTO to administer all the re-
sulting agreements. However, the continued plurilateral nature
8 of
the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement ("WTO GPA"),
and the so far unsuccessful attempts to negotiate its multilateral
equivalent, has meant that transparency and non-discrimination in
government procurement remains an arrangement for a few will-
6 Simeon A. Sahaydachny & Don Wallace Jr., Opening Government Procure-
ment Markets, in TRADE RULES IN THE MAKING: CHALLENGES IN REGIONAL AND
MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS 462 (Miguel R. Mendoza et al. eds., 1999).
7 Id. According to Vinod Rege,
[w]hen GATT was being negotiated in 1947, the countries participating
in the negotiations did not want to change the practices they followed in
procuring goods. These often involved requiring purchasing agencies to
show preference on price or other considerations to domestic producers,
or to buy from countries with which the country had historical ties, even
though goods at lower prices were available in other countries.
Vinod Rege, Transparency in Government Procurement: Issues of Concern and Interest
to Developing Countries, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 489, 491 (2001). Because of these con-
cerns, which would have flouted the key non-discrimination provisions of the
GATT, it was decided to include an explicit exception in Article III, paragraph
8(a), which reads: "The provisions of this Article [on non-discrimination] shall not
apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the procurement by gov-
ernmental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes and not
with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods
for commercial sale." GATT, supra note 1, art. III.
s According to Tunkin, "plurilateral" means that the agreement is of interest
only to a small group of countries, while its opposite, "multilateral" simply means
that the agreement is of interest to all countries. Grigory Tunkin, Is General Inter-
national Law Customary Law Only?, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 534, 537 (1993).
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ing countries. 9 Currently, the agreement has twenty-eight mem-
bers 10 and twenty-three observers.' Seven countries are in the
process of negotiating membership.12 The common thread one no-
tices when glancing through the list of subscribing countries is the
domination of the developed world, mainly the OECD block. Ex-
cept for Cameroon, which is an observer, there is no other African
country that is in any way associated with the agreement.
What is distressing, however, is that some of the poorer coun-
tries' decision not to sign the WTO GPA seems guided by priorities
that are defeated by other factors inherent in these countries, and
have nothing to do with a careful and honest assessment of what
the nations really stand to gain or lose by signing.' 3 In offering the
explanation that they would like to shield their domestic suppliers
from external competition for government tenders, and nurture
various strategic sectors, these countries are deliberately missing
the point. They are being bled to ruination by terribly warped pro-
curement laws and policies.' 4 The poor implementation of pro-
9 For an excellent review of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") and the
evolution and enforcement of government procurement rules, please see SUE
ARROWSMITH, GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT IN THE WTO (2003) and Sue Arrows-
mith, Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement,
47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 793 (1998).
10 These are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Communities,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong China, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, It-
aly, Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Netherlands with
respect to Aruba, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, and the United States. Singapore, which was a signatory to the
Tokyo Round Agreement, did not sign it in 1994 but it later joined in 1997. WTO,
Government Procurement: Plurilateral Agreement, at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop.e/gproc-e/memobse.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
1 These are: Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Czech Republic,
Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Mongolia, Oman, Panama, Poland, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, and Turkey. Kenya, which was an observer in the GATT Agreement on
Government Procurement ("GATT GPA"), did not take up observership status in
the WTO GPA. Id.
12 Bulgaria, Estonia, Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Panama and Chinese
Taipei. Id.
13 In contrast, and for a good discussion on how Korea went about establish-
ing whether or not to sign the GPA, please see Inborn Choi, Long and Winding
Road to the Government Procurement Agreement: Korea's Accession Experience
(1999) (paper presented at the World Bank-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
("PECC") Trade Policy Forum Seminar on East Asia and Options for WTO 2000
Negotiations), available at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/manila/
gpa-korea.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
14 However, there are a number of other plausible reasons as to why develop-
ing countries have not been eager to sign the WTO GPA. The first is that the de-
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curement laws and policies, or their absence, effectively kills com-
petition for tender awards and makes it the exclusive preserve of a
few well-connected businessmen and their contact persons in vari-
ous government departments. The upshot is that even as they con-
tinue to stay out of the agreement, developing countries are not
reaping the strategic economic benefits of diminished (or elimi-
nated) external competition in the government supply sector.
Consequently, and as currently handled in most African coun-
tries, the procurement policies are pushing weak economies into
further underdevelopment due to increasing budget deficits and
corrupt practices that divert funds to private hands rather than
meaningful development projects. 15 The policies are weakening
potentially sound development strategies and need to be quickly
reformed. It is customarily difficult to effect positive legal changes
in developing countries without external pressure, particularly in a
sector such as government procurement with a potentially strong
lobby in the form of a cabal of beneficiary businessmen.16 There-
veloping countries' share of the government procurement market is very small at
the moment, and "the gains from exports that would flow from membership of
the agreement are therefore likely to be marginal in the case of most developing
countries at least in the foreseeable future." Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C.
Mavroidis, Multilateralizing the Agreement on Government Procurement, in LAW AND
POLICY IN PUBLIC PURCHASING: THE WTO AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT
PROCUREMENT 296-98 (Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000).
The second reason, related to the first, is that developed countries will in fact
benefit more from such entry of developing countries into the applicability of the
agreement due to their large share of the market, general economies of scale, ag-
gression, and easier access to information of existing government supply con-
tracts. Thirdly, according to Vinod Rege, "[ijf there is a potential for development
in trade by the developing countries in the procurement sector, it is with
neighbouring countries in the region. For this membership of the [WTO] GPA is
not necessary." Rege, supra note 7, at 495.
15 For an interesting study on the relationship between corruption and devel-
opment, please see Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A Review of Is-
sues, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1320 (1997). See also John Linarelli, Corruption in De-
veloping Countries and in Countries in Transition: Legal and Economic Perspective, in
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: GLOBAL REVOLUTION 125 (Sue Arrowsmith & Arwel Davies
eds., 1998) (reflecting the changes of the implementation of public procurement
reform programmes and the efforts to open up procurement and international
trade).
16 See Robert R. Hunja, Obstacles to Public Procurement Reform in Developing
Countries, in PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: THE CONTINUING REVOLUTION 17 (Sue Arrows-
mith & Martin Trybus eds., 2003), noting that reform of public procurement laws
in developing countries is difficult, because inter alia:
those in the private sector and their collaborators in the public institu-
tions who benefit from such flawed systems have a very strong vested
interest in the maintenance of the Status quo. Vested interests in such
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fore, these countries should consider the possible benefits of a
mandatory international regulatory framework that would ideally
come in the "single-undertaking" 17 package of the WTO. This
package would compel these countries to implement more open
procurement policies because of the multilateral commitments.
There would be positive economic and cathartic effects of such a
framework. It would expose the policies with which some gov-
ernments have been covering their wasteful ways and impoverish-
ing their peoples in the process. However, despite the recognition
that a multilateral framework agreement on government procure-
ment is necessary, its provisions will have to be subjected to careful
scrutiny, especially by developing country negotiators. Such an
agreement will have to be grounded on the singular objective of
supporting the development priorities of the poor world. The bal-
ance between the quest for openness and governmental flexibility
to foster development will have to be determined by each country
making an honest assessment of corruption and the implementa-
tion costs of the agreement. The cost would include the ready
availability of procurement professionals in the country, while at
systems can also manifest themselves in various other ways. They can,
for example, include local business cartels who may have an interest in
maintaining a legal framework that prohibits competition from foreign
suppliers. In many developing countries, access to public contracts also
serves as a means to reward political supporters to finance political par-
ties.
17 The "single undertaking" approach in multilateral trade negotiations was
first introduced in Section B(ii) of the 1986 Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration
launching the Uruguay Round, which provided as follows:
The launching, the conduct and the implementation of the outcome of the
negotiations shall be treated as parts of a single undertaking. However,
agreements reached at an early stage may be implemented on a provi-
sional or a definitive basis by agreement prior to the formal conclusion of
the negotiations. Early agreements shall be taken into account in assess-
ing the overall balance of the negotiations.
Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Sept. 20, 1986, GATT B.I.S.D.
(33rd Supp.) at 20 (1985-1986) (emphasis added). Under WTO practice, it has been
explained to mean that virtually every item of the negotiation is part of a whole
and indivisible package and cannot be agreed separately. WTO, Doha Declara-
tion Explained, at http://www.wto.org/English/tratop-e/dda-e/dohaexplained
_e.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2004). For a very useful discussion on the concept of"single undertaking," and in particular, the concerns of developing countries in its
application, see CHANDRAKANT PATEL, TITLE 1 (South Centre, Trade-Related
Agenda, Dev. and Equity, Working Paper No. 15, 2003) and Robert Wolfe, Global
Trade as a Single Undertaking: The Role of Ministers in the WTO, 51 INTL J. 690 (1996)
(discussing the importance of a new principle of the trade regime).
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the same time, subscribing to the desires of a multilateral order.
However, under no circumstances should the agreement contain
any provisions or imply any obligations that work against genuine
efforts to bring about development. In this regard, it must leave a
measure of flexibility governments can use to promote local indus-
try and provide a mechanism by which such actions can be prop-
erly quantified and accounted for at the international level. It
should outline certain minimum standards that must be met before
derogation from the international framework is allowable. A forti-
ori, it should provide a remedy for potential tenderers or suppliers,
local or international, who wish to challenge the process or the
outcome of the government procurement process. Governments
should therefore have the possibility, within defined limits, to re-
quire successful foreign tenderers to form joint ventures with local
enterprises or subcontract to a certain extent by, for example, re-
quiring a certain preferential percentage of the supplies to be lo-
cally sourced.
2. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
Public procurement can, and does, have a large impact on the
development goals of poor countries due to its sheer size relative
to the economies of most developing countries, ranging from eight
to twelve percent of the gross domestic product.18 There is a direct
correlation between government procurement and development. 19
This direct relationship is demonstrable in a number of ways.
First, public procurement is the interface at which public demands,
such as infrastructure and medical supplies, meet the private sector
suppliers, such as construction companies and pharmaceutical
drugs suppliers. Most of the large-scale public requirements that
must be met through public procurement are classic development
needs, such as roads, railways, bridges, hospitals, medical sup-
plies, and others. In this sense, public procurement provides the
direct avenue, with high levels of expertise, for governments to
meet their development challenges. As Wittig notes, "the more fo-
18 Federico Trionfetti, Discriminatory Public Procurement and International
Trade, 23 WORLD ECON. 57, 73 (2000).
19 According to Vinod Rege, "[i]t is a widely held view in most... [develop-
ing countries] that central and local authorities can make significant contributions to
the development of national industries and employment by awarding contracts to
domestic suppliers and contractors or by giving preferences to the procurement of
domestically produced goods, services or works." Rege, supra note 7, at 496 (em-
phasis added).
2004]
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cused the management of public procurement, the better a country
can take advantage of its purchasing power to help development
efforts." 2
0
The second direct way in which public procurement interfaces
with national development needs is through the "value for
money," and hence, higher savings goal of public procurement.
21
Getting "value for money" is established as a basic component of
sound public sector management, which emphasizes performance
efficiency, cost cutting, and general fiscal discipline. 22 In this way,
government and public sector management entities are able to
avoid unnecessary and wasteful spending, hence lowering opera-
tional costs and increasing the rate of savings. In the end, this
translates into general lower government spending and lower
budget deficits, a fundamental problem throughout the developing
world. It also translates into a less acute need for external financial
injections from multilateral lending institutions such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It thereby reduces
debt-servicing commitments, which have been shown to have dis-
astrous economic effects because of escalating and unsustainably
high interest rates.
Third, governments can use public procurement as a direct so-
cial and economic development tool. Imaginative and develop-
20 WAYNE WITTIG, INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND
THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 3 (2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop.e/groc-e/wkshop-tanz-jan03/itcdemol-e.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
21 See Hunja, supra note 16, at 13, noting that:
in the face of shrinking budgets and the need to fight corruption, gov-
ernments are realizing that significant savings can be gained by a well-
organized procurement system."); see also REPUBLIC OF KENYA MINISTRY
OF FINANCE AND PLANNING, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT USER'S GUIDE 2 (2002)
(stating that in public procurement, "while price paid is important, what
is far more important is obtaining value for money .... When selecting a
candidate [for a public procurement contract], the procuring entity
should try to find an organization that will meet its needs in quality,
quantity and timing at the lowest cost ....
22 According to Professor Steven Schooner, in the United States, for instance,
the "procurement policy aspires to obtain quality supplies, services, and
construction economically, efficiently, and in a timely manner. Federal
procurement law, regulation, and policy seek to procure the best value for the
taxpayer in a system that is transparent, maximizes competition, and ensures
integrity." Are Big Businesses Being Awarded Contracts Intended for Small
Businesses?: Before the House Comm. on Small Business, 105th Cong. 12 (2003) at 10
[hereinafter House Hearing] (statement of Prof. Steven L. Schooner, George
Washington University Law School), available at http://www.law.gwu.edu/
facweb/schooner/smallbiz-03.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
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ment conscious poor governments can formulate a public pro-
curement strategy that gives preference to suppliers from certain
sectors and nurture their development and long-term competitive-
ness.23 Governments can use public procurement as a tool for
lending support to small and medium scale enterprises, for over-
coming regional or sectoral unemployment problems, providing
support to minority or disadvantaged communities or workers, en-
suring fair treatment of employees and so on.24 Many countries do
have such policies, but in much of Africa such policies need to be
systematized and mainstreamed into a coherent national develop-
ment, transparent, and efficient strategy.25 The United States 26 and
23 Sahaydachny and Wallace have written describing the preference of do-
mestic suppliers as a "cruder tool" for fostering developing. However, they arrive
at the same conclusion in general that public procurement can indeed be used to
promote economic development. Arguing for a "new" conception of public pro-
curement, they note:
With a new view of how government procurement can be harnessed in
the service of economic development, decreasing emphasis is placed on
the cruder tools of exclusion of foreign bidders and margins of prefer-
ence in favor of domestic bidders; instead, more recognition is given to
the economic development benefits of measures such as the following:
Training and monitoring public entities to upgrade their procurement
skills and to reduce faulty implementation procedures .... Training the
private sector, especially SMEs, in the skills required for effective partici-
pation in public procurement. Using procurement packaging techniques
that permit SMEs to "get the foot in the door" of procurement markets.
More effectively disseminating information about procurement opportu-
nities and distributing bid solicitation documents in a more timely fash-
ion. Facilitating the availability of bid and performance securities for
SMEs or in certain cases waiving such requirements. Providing informa-
tion to failed bidders as to the reasons for their failure so that they can
improve their competitiveness .... Promptly paying amounts due un-
der procurement contracts.
Sahaydachny & Wallace, supra note 6, at 463-64.
24 See House Hearing, supra note 22, at 10 ("Government contracts further
goals such as fostering small businesses, overcoming regional unemployment, as-
sisting minority workers, ensuring fair treatment of employees, protecting the en-
vironment, and, where appropriate, providing preferences to domestic and other
special sources of supply, such as the blind and severely handicapped.").
25 See Hunja, supra note 16, at 9 (suggesting the introduction of standard bid-
ding documents and use of electronic announcement of contract awards to im-
prove transparency and efficiency).
26 See House Hearing, supra note 22, at 1-2 (noting that the "Small Business
Administration Reauthorization Act of 1997 raised the government-wide goal for
small business participation from 20 percent to 23 percent .... [Fliscal year 2001
was a terrific year for small businesses in federal procurement. Small businesses
received an additional $5.3 billion in contract awards-an increase of more than
twelve percent."). Small Business Administration Reauthorization Act of 1997, 15
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South Africa are examples of countries that have employed a sys-
tematic public procurement policy to support, respectively, small
enterprises and a hitherto disenfranchised black business commu-
nity. For savvy developing countries, even signatory status in the
WTO GPA should not prevent them from supporting their domes-
tic industry. They can use the fairly flexible provisions under Arti-
cle V of the WTO GPA to argue for preference of domestic suppli-
ers. The "broad preference provisions in favour of domestic
bidders" 27 in procurement policies in the Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa ("COMESA") region have been de-
scribed by some commentators as "a deficiency.., in practices and
procedures." 28 However, it is certainly within the rights of any re-
sponsible state to favor its nationals, particularly when in a com-
petitive and open manner. Properly done, this is a useful devel-
opment tool for poor countries.
3. ABUSE OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAWS: THE CASE OF KENYA
Kenya is in the process of preparing a new law on government
procurement. It is part of the anti-corruption efforts of a new de-
mocratically elected government that came into power in Decem-
ber 2002. While it may be too early to judge the commitment of the
new government to meaningful and consistent anti-corruption ini-
tiatives, one can already discern either a definite unwillingness to
move forward with serious reforms or an implicit acquiescence of
corrupt practices, especially within the government procurement
process.
This Section of the Article will examine Kenya's public pro-
curement laws and their practical application. In examining their
practical application, two recent examples will be considered, one
by a government ministry and the other by a parastatal body. The
first example is the recent controversy over the procurement of
HIV/AIDS testing equipment by the Ministry of Health. The sec-
ond is the procurement of cranes by the Kenya Ports Authority.
This Section will end with a brief examination of the proposed
U.S.C. § 644(g) (1997).
27 Stephen Karangizi, Regional Procurement Reform Initiative 10 (Jan. 14-17,
2003) (paper presented at Joint WTO-World Bank Regional Workshop on Pro-
curement Reforms and Transparency in Public Procurement for English Speaking
African Countries), available at http://www.wto.org/ english/tratop-e/gproc-e/
wkshop-tanz-jan03/karangizil-e.doc.
28 See id.
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Public Procurement and Disposal Bill ("Procurement Bill")29 that is
currently before the Kenyan Parliament and how it may revolu-
tionalize Kenya's government procurement process. This bill has
already received the approval of the Cabinet of Ministers and is
due for a second reading in Parliament.30 The government has
stated its commitment to getting the bill enacted into law.31
3.1. Public Procurement in Kenya
There are key features of Kenya's current public procurement
system. First, it is decentralized - it has a three-tier system with
procurement procedures spelled out for the central government,
local authorities, parastatal organs, and other bodies such as uni-
versities, colleges, schools, and cooperative societies. 32 Second, it
provides a procedure to review tender awards by unsuccessful
bidders. 33 The administration of the public procurement system in
Kenya is the responsibility of the Public Procurement Directorate, a
small department within the Ministry of Finance. The department
was created in 2001 following the enactment of the Exchequer and
Audit Act (Public Procurement Regulations) on the order of Legal
Notice No. 51 on March 30, 2001. The department is headed by a
29 Public Procurement and Disposal Bill, Kenya Gazette Supp. No. 59 (June
24, 2003) [hereinafter Procurement Bill].
30 Honorable John Mutua Katuku, Assistant Minister, Ministry of Finance,
Opening Speech at the Stakeholders Workshop to Review the Public Procurement
and Disposal Bill 2003 (Nov. 4, 2003) (on file with author).
31 See id. ("[T]he government is committed to having the Public Procurement
Law enacted .... [T]he Public Procurement and Disposal Bill 2003 has already
been approved by the Cabinet and is in Parliament. It is due for the second read-
ing.").
32 See generally PUBLIC PROCUREMENT USER'S GUIDE, supra note 21. For an ex-
cellent and concise overview of Kenya's procurement system, please see WALTER
ODHIAMBO & PAUL KAMAU, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: LESSONS FROM KENYA, TANZANIA
AND UGANDA 10 (OECD Development Center, Technical Paper No. 208, 2003),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dev/technics (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
33 See generally Gerrishon K. Ikiara, Public Procurement: Strengths, Weak-
nesses and Implications for Economic Governance (2002) (paper presented at the
Conference on Constitutional Reform to Fight Corruption) ("Appropriate pro-
curement procedures enable governments to obtain good services in a more eco-
nomic and fair way and make public expenditures cost effective."), available at
http://www.kenyaconstitution.org/docs/07d045.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
See also Gerrishon. K. Ikiara, The Role of Government Institutions in Kenya's Industri-
alization, in INDUSTRIALIZATION IN KENYA: IN SEARCH OF A STRATEGY 218 (Peter
Coughlin & Gerrishon K. Ikiara eds., 1988) (recommending policies to enhance the
beneficial impact of government involvement in the industrialization process are
recommended).
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director and two deputy directors. The first deputy director is re-
sponsible for monitoring, training, and evaluation. The second is
responsible for legal and policy affairs. 34
However, the department itself does not engage in procure-
ment. The directorate coordinates and oversees all levels of public
procurement and according to the regulations is "the central organ
of the policy formulation, implementation, human resources de-
velopment, and oversight of the public procurement process in
Kenya." 35 According to the Public Procurement Regulations, the
directorate's mandate includes: monitoring the functioning of the
public procurement process in Kenya;36 developing and supporting
the training and professional development of officials and other
persons engaged in public procurement, including their adherence
to ethical standards; 37 organizing and participating in administra-
tive review procedures; 38 planning and coordinating technical as-
sistance in public procurement; maintaining and updating a list of
all procuring entities and members and secretaries of the various
tender committees; 39 inspecting procurement agencies for compli-
ance with the public procurement regulations; receiving and proc-
essing any procuring entity, the Public Procurement Complaints,
Review and Appeals Board ("Appeals Board"), or any general or
specific comments pertaining to public procurement;40 and acting
as a secretariat to consultative meetings with individuals from the
public or private sectors who have a stake in the procurement
process.41 The directorate also plays an advisory role to the Minis-
try and prepares annual reports detailing major national develop-
ments in the procurement process.42 In its advisory role, the direc-
torate is also responsible for formulating Kenya's position at the
34 Luke Obiri, Public Procurement Reforms Strategy: The Kenya Experience
9-10 (2003) (paper presented at the WTO Symposium on Government Procure-
ment) (on file with author). According to this recent paper by the Director, the
department is under-staffed, lacks the necessary funds for effective operation, and
lacks necessary equipment such as fax machines, photocopiers, computers, and
especially vehicles, which are particularly necessary for the department's inspec-
tion activities. Id.
35 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT USER'S GUIDE, supra note 21, at 14.
36 Id. app. 4, at 40.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See Obiri, supra note 34, at 2-3.
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WTO with regard to possible negotiations on multilateral govern-
ment procurement agreements. The director is a member of
Kenya's National Committee on the WTO, a fourteen-member
committee that brings together both government officials and civil
society representatives for deliberations on Kenya's current and fu-
ture WTO commitments and their implementation.
Importantly, Legal Notice No. 51 of March 30, 2001 (Kenya Ga-
zette Supplement No. 24) and Legislative Supplement No. 16 create
the Appeals Board. The purpose of this Appeals Board is to pro-
vide an avenue of review and possibly resolve ajy complaints by
unsuccessful tenderers. It is empowered to formulate its own rules
of procedure and those of the secretariat that support its activities.
The Appeals Board has jurisdiction over both legal and procedural
issues and is constrained to render its decision within thirty days
of the complaint notice. It is obliged to arrive at a well-reasoned,
well-explained decision and any remedies award. The decision
must be rendered in the presence of the parties.
The Appeals Board has a wide arsenal of remedies it can pre-
scribe. It can terminate procurement proceedings; it can revise an
unlawful decision award and substitute it with its own decision,
save that it cannot make an actual tender award; it can annul, in
whole or in part, an unlawful act or decision of the procuring en-
tity, save that it cannot take a decision bringing the procurement
contract into force; it can require the procuring entity that has acted
or proceeded in an unlawful manner or reached an unlawful deci-
sion to act or to proceed in a lawful manner, or reach a lawful deci-
sion; it can prohibit the procuring entity from acting or deciding
unlawfully or from following an unlawful procedure; and it can
declare the legal rules and principles governing the subject matter
of the complaint.
The decisions of the Appeals Board are deemed final but may
be subject to judicial review, a process which must commence
within thirty days of the decision. This review must be premised
on existing law regarding judicial review of administrative actions.
In Kenya, as in most common law jurisdictions, the courts are re-
posed with the power of judicial review on the basis that the role of
judges is not simply to interpret the law and settle disputes, but
also to monitor the exercise of governmental power. Hence, based
on the principle of "rule of law" and the "doctrine of separation of
powers," the courts are supposed to place a check on executive ex-
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tremes.43 Through judicial review of administrative action, public
bodies are restrained from an ultra vires exercise of their powers.
In Rex v. Electricity Commissioners,44 an old English case cited with
approval by Kenya's Court of Appeal in David Mugo t/a Manyatta
Auctioneers v. The Republic,45 it was held that "whenever any body
of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting
the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in
excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling ju-
risdiction of the High Court exercised in its writs." 46
Bearing this in mind, for the Appeals Board, one could envis-
age a judicial review action based on a challenge of the legitimacy
of the subsidiary legislation on which its decisions are founded.
Since the Public Procurement Regulations are subsidiary legisla-
tion, they must be in conformity with the provisions of the ena-
bling statute, in this case, the Exchequer and Audit Act.47 A failure
43 See generally M.J.C. Vile, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POW-
ERS (2d ed. 1998) (describing "separation of powers" as the concept that the legis-
lative, judicial, and executive branches of government ought to be separate and
distinct and positing that through this separation, each branch works according to
its own authority, forming a check or balance against any abuse of power by the
remaining two branches). This concept has been a strong feature of modern de-
mocratic constitution-making and is also considered a foregone conclusion. Ac-
cording to James Madison, "no political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic
value." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 313 (Modem Library ed., 1941). For the origins
of the concept, please see HANNIS TAYLOR, THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE
ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 62 (1889) (noting, for example, that Montesquieu was ac-
cepted as the oracle of political theory for that time). For the influence of this con-
cept on the framers of the U.S. Constitution, please see DAVID HUTCHISON, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 20-21 (1928). See also Yash Ghai, The Rule of
Law, Legitimacy and Governance, 14 INT'L J. Soc. L. 179, 179-208 (1987) (discussing
the experiences of governments in Africa).
44 The King v. Elec. Comm'rs, ex parte London Elec. Joint Comm. Co., [1924] 1
K.B. 171, 289 (C.A.).
45 David Mugo t/a Manyatta Auctioneers v. The Republic, Civ. App. No. 265
(Nairobi Ct. App. 1997) (Kenya) (unreported).
46 Elec. Cornm'rs, [1924] 1 K.B. at 205.
47 In another unreported case, Stanley Njindo Matiba v. Att'y Gen., the appli-
cant sought certiorari in the high court to quash a decision by the Attorney General
denying him permission to hire a foreign lawyer to represent him in an election
petition in a Kenyan court. Civ. App. No. 42 (Nairobi Ct. App. 1994) (Kenya) (un-
reported), available at http://www.uni-bayreuth.de/departments/afrikarecht/
kenya64.html. The application, lodged with leave of the court, was grounded in
subsidiary legislation, that is, Legal Notice No. 164. In his ruling the judge stated:
Rules made pursuant to a statute are subsidiary legislation. They
are made under delegated powers. A delegate's power is confined
to the objects of the legislature. The main reason of delegation is
that the legislation itself cannot go into sufficient detail. So it makes
a skeleton Act. The delegate supplies meat, thus the intention of the
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to sustain such consistency could lead to a declaration of the regu-
lations as being null and void.48 One could also foresee a chal-
lenge, based on the Appeals Board's rules of procedures, as being
inconsistent with the principles of natural justice.
3.2. The Procurement of Aids Testing Equipment by the Ministry of
Health
The first example of an application of public procurement laws
in Kenya involves the procurement of HIV/AIDS testing equip-
ment by Kenya's Ministry of Health. HIV/AIDS has been declared
a national disaster in Kenya due to the number of people infected
and dying daily from the disease. The government has taken vari-
ous steps to control the disease including the acquisition of some
high-value equipment necessary for the treatment of HIV/AIDS
patients. In this regard, the government conducted a tendering
process for the procurement of twenty-eight bench-top cytometry
systems machines that are used to measure the count of a specific
group of white blood cells, known as CD4 cells, amongst
HIV/AIDS patients. 49 These machines assist in identifying patients
whose immune system is low and hence help physicians determine
whether such patients should be placed on anti-retroviral drugs.
The machines, 5 0 valued at over US $1.5 million were to be distrib-
legislation must always be the prima facie guide to the meaning of
the delegated legislation.
Id. The court went on to find the purported amendment of Order 53 of the Legal
Procedure Rules, by Legal Notice No. 164 of 1994, null and void to the extent of its
inconsistency with Section 9 of Kenya's Law Reform Act. Introduction to Judicial
Review of Administrative Action, East Africa Legal Resource Center (Jan. 22, 2002),
at http://www.eastafrican law.com/LawArticle/judicial-review.htm.
48 Id.; Koinange Mbiu v. Republic, Chancery Reports 440 (1921) (Kenya) (cit-
ing a Kenyan case which held that a regulation on the growing of coffee in colo-
nial Kenya was made in a manner that was inconsistent with the parent statute
and therefore null and void).
49 The Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") virus attacks the
CD4 cells and multiplies within the cells, gradually reducing their numbers in the
human body and thus weakening the immune system. See generally Robert S.
Hogg et al., Rates of Disease Progression by Baseline CD4 Cell Count and Viral Load
after Initiating Triple-Drug Therapy, 286 JAMA 2568 (2001).
50 The Author has been unable to verify whether twenty-eight or thirty ma-
chines were ordered. News reports use both numbers. Compare Luke Mulunda,
Red Flags Raised over Procurement of HIV/Aids Equipment, FIN. STANDARD, Oct. 7-13,
2003 (quoting a figure of thirty), available at http://www.eastandard.net/archives
/October/tue07102003/financialstandard/news/news07102003009.htm, with Why
the DMS was Replaced, DAILY NATION, Nov. 19, 2003 (quoting a figure of twenty-
eight), available at http://www.nationaudio.com/news/dailynation/19112003/
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uted to various hospitals throughout the country.
As in numerous other instances when the Kenyan government
has had a need for procurement, Crown Agents was engaged by
the Ministry of Health to conduct the procurement process on its
behalf. The Kenya government has had a long-running relation-
ship with Crown Agents, a self-described "international develop-
ment company delivering capacity-building and institutional de-
velopment consultancy," providing services in public sector
transformation, particularly in revenue enhancement and expendi-
ture management, banking, public finance, training, and procure-
ment.51 The Crown Agents went on to invite bids through their
head office in the United Kingdom, for the supply of the equip-
ment from two firms: Becton, Dickinson and Company ("Becton"),
a medical technology firm based in Franklin Lakes, New Jersey;5 2
and Partec GmbH, a German company that pioneered cytomics
and cell analysis by flow cytometry.5 3
It is noteworthy that Crown Agents did not advertise the ten-
der in the media. The reason given for this was that it "was a re-
stricted tender due to its exigency."5 4 Crown Agents evaluated the
submitted bids and drafted a report for the Ministry of Health that
took into account the "technical specification of the equipment of-
fered, the landed cost including delivery to site, installation and
training ... [and] whether the systems offered were open or closed
... as well as the costs of the reagents." 55 Since government pro-
curement in Kenya is decentralized, further evaluation of the
agent's report and decision for the final tender award fell for de-
termination in the nine-member Ministerial Tender Committee
within the Ministry of Health. This committee is chaired by the Di-
rector of Medical Services, a civil servant directly appointed by the
News/News1911200336.html.
51 Crown Agents website, at http://www.crownagents.com (last visited Mar.
26, 2004).
52 BD website, at http://www.bd.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2004). In Kenya,
this company is represented by Faram East Africa Ltd., a company that is reputed
to have "strong links with top officials at Afya House," which is the headquarters
of the Ministry of Health. Mulunda, supra note 50. The machine it was to supply
is known as a FACSCount Machine.
53 Partec website, at http://www.partec.de (last visited Mar. 26, 2004). In
Kenya, this company is represented by Flambert Holdings Ltd. The machine it
was to supply is known as a Cyflow Machine.
54 Mulunda, supra note 50 (quoting the remarks-of Mr. Alan Pringle of Crown
Agents).
55 Id.
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President. The Ministerial Tender Committee chose Becton, re-
portedly after consultations with the "relevant technical depart-
ments and the University of Nairobi."5 6 However, some senior
government officials, having expressed preference for Partec, were
dissatisfied with the award of the tender. Partec then appealed to
the Appeals Board but no decision has been issued yet.
57
Shortly after the tender award, the Director of Medical Services
of the awarding committee was replaced under circumstances that
were tied to that particular tender award. Some observers have at-
tributed the replacement to errors "in drawing up specifications in
two tenders for the supply of anti-retroviral [drugs] for use in
Kenya's pioneering A[IDS] treatment programme, as well as in
awarding another Ksh 100 million ([US] $1.3 million) tender for the
supply of [twenty-eight] CD4 machines for use in the treatment
programme."5 8 The original specifications of the machines were
altered to correspond to the particular product of the eventual win-
ner of the bid during the tendering process.59 According to a letter
from a company representative from Partec that was quoted by
journalists, Partec's competitor had been "closely informed con-
cerning the details and the final amount of Partec's offer [and was
therefore] in a comfortable position to submit an offer slightly be-
low that of Partec." 60
Aside from the irregularities in the tendering process caused by
undue information disclosure to a rival bidder, the Becton ma-
chines also had extremely high maintenance and operation costs.
Moreover, there were significant price differences between the two
bids. The Becton machine was valued at KSh 2.7 million a piece
while the Partec machine was valued at KSh 1.9 million a piece, a
difference of KSh 0.8 million in favor of the unsuccessful bidder.
Besides this price differential, the Becton machines had some seri-
ous technical limitations. They were "a closed system" 61- that is,
56 Id.
57 See Why the DMS was Replaced, supra note 50 (noting that the Director of
Medical Services came under intense pressure from some government officials to
revoke the tender award, but he declined).
58 Dagi Kimani, Opposition to Meme Led to Muga's Removal, THE E. AFR., Nov.
24, 2003, available at http://nationaudio.com/news/eastafrican/24112003/
regional/regional2411200318.html.
59 See Mulunda, supra note 50 (reporting that original specifications for the
CD4 counting machines were altered to suit BD's FACS Count machine).
60 Id. (quoting a letter written on the behalf of Partec GmbH by a Mr. Roland
Goehde).
61 Id.
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they could only use one type of reagent supplied by Becton. In
contrast, the Partec machines could use reagents and accessories
available through various manufacturers. Finally, there was a sig-
nificant difference in the cost of the tests conducted by the two
types of machines. An AIDS patient tested on a Becton machine
would pay KSh 720, while on a Partec machine it would cost KSh
160. This has serious implications for the availability of the testing
facility the government had the intention of providing in a more
accessible manner.62
In this case study, the tender specifications were tailored to suit
one particular supplier and as a result, the government suffered a
terrible loss in revenue, among other faulty procurement practices.
If Kenya was a signatory to the WTO GPA, the specifications
would have to be in accordance with international standards.
3.3. The Procurement of Cranes by the Kenya Ports Authority
The Kenya Ports Authority is a parastatal created following the
collapse of the East African Community and the regional East Af-
rica Harbours Corporation in 1977 and was established following
the enactment of the Kenya Ports Authority Act.63 The authority is
based in Mombasa, the main Kenyan seaport and a major interna-
tional maritime link. The deep water port in Mombasa has twenty-
one berths, two bulk oil jetties, ample dry-bulk wharves and can
service ships of all sizes and all types of cargo. It has specialist
cold storage and warehousing facilities and is well linked to the
inland ports in three of Kenya's major towns, including Nairobi,
the capital city. The authority is responsible for all maritime port
activities.
Irregularities have been a common feature of the procurement
process at the Mombasa port, particularly due to the sheer sums of
money involved in port activities. The latest irregular tendering
process centered on a tender for the supply of six cranes for use at
the port valued at US $20 million and advertised by the Kenya
Ports Authority. The international tender advertisement was is-
sued on August 12, 2003 and was to close on September 26, 2003.
The bid bond was lowered from US $300,000 to US $70,000,
prompting the postponement of the tender opening process. There
62 Id.
63 For information on the establishment of the Kenya Ports Authority, see
Procurement and Tendering System at the Port, Kenya Ports Authority, at
http://www.kenya-ports.com/procurement.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
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were other postponements that will be discussed in detail later
where irregular and direct government interference was evident.
It is important to note that since the public procurement proc-
ess in Kenya is decentralized, the Kenya Ports Authority has its
own procurement committee, which is functionally independent
and not subject to the control of the government.64 If a bidder is
aggrieved by the decision of this committee, they have the right to
appeal to the Appeals Board. Recent jurisprudence also allows an
aggrieved bidder to apply to the High Court for an injunction,
pending the outcome of the appeal in the Appeals Board. In the
recent case of Baumann Engineering Ltd. v. Kenya Ports Authority,65
the plaintiff was awarded an injunction restraining the defendants
from "signing, executing or endorsing a contract, deed or memo-
randum with Damen Shipyards Holland in pursuance of tender
No. KPA/102/2002PM" until the hearing and determination of an
appeal lodged with the Appeals Board. The injunction, applied for
under certificate of urgency, was granted based on the applicant's
plea that Baumann Engineering had filed an appeal with the Ap-
peals Board, and if the application was not granted, the applicant's
appeal with the Appeals Board "would be rendered nugatory and
the whole public procurement structure and system would be
brought in to public ridicule and disrepute." 66 Additionally, the
applicant contended that their appeal to the Appeals Board was
premised on well-founded allegations of a fundamental nature:
the Kenya Ports Authority carried out a "flawed, irregular and
manipulated tender process to the advantage of, and in favor of,
Damen Shipyards Holland" and that there was a strong possibility
that the award would be nullified by the Appeals Board.67 In its
64 For information on the minimum criteria required for registration as a sup-
plier at the Kenya Port Authority, see id. The requirements are quite basic. All
prospective suppliers are required to submit the following to the Procurement &
Supplies Manager's office: an application letter; a certified copy of certificate of
registration; a certified copy of a certificate of VAT; a certified copy of their PIN
number; a trade license; a certificate from Ministry of Public Works for construc-
tion & civil works, or relevant certificates for other services; a business question-
naire, duly signed and stamped; for scrap dealers, a scrap dealer license and cer-
tificate of good conduct is mandatory; and a registration fee of Kshs.1,000.00 in
cash or banker's check. Id.
65 Baumann Eng'g Ltd. v. Kenya Ports Auth., Civ. Case No. 524 (High Ct.
2003) (Kenya) (unreported) (on file with author).
66 Boniface Kaona, Court Stops KPA from Awarding Shlb Tender, E. AFR.
STANDARD, June 4, 2003, available at http://www.eastandard.net/archives/June/
wed04062003/national/nat04062003009.htm.
67 Id.
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ruling, the court stated:
Having regard to the matters raised in the affidavits on
both sides, and arguments by the advocates for the parties,
this court is satisfied that a candidate who is unsuccessful
at bidding for a tender who wishes to resort to his right of
appeal has a right which is protectable [sic] by injunctive
relief. Its complaint through the appeal process allowed
under a statute should not be frustrated by a measure,
which might wrongfully pre-empt it and render it useless.
A statutory appeal procedure should be allowed to run its
full course and not be made futile or otherwise useless by
some action that might interfere with it. A complaining
candidate who fears legitimately that his right under the
appeal procedure might be wrecked or otherwise rendered
hollow has a right, which if it is interfered with can thereby
be injured. Injury thereby likely to be occasioned may be
averted by injunctive relief.68
This is an important precedent to be used by unsuccessful ten-
derers whose appeals would otherwise prove worthless if the ten-
der is executed between the initial award and the outcome of the
appeals process in the Appeals Board. As was further stated by the
court:
[I]f no injunction were granted, and the defendant decides
to act on the questioned tender and signs the contract on
that basis, and it turns out that the appeal succeeds, a third
party who won the tender might be inconvenienced, and
contractual obligations and rights of third parties and the
[g]overnment may be adversely affected. In the alternative,
it may be too late for the applicant to take part in the proc-
ess. Damages might not be quantifiable. 69
It is instructive that this particular tender award that was an-
nulled by the Appeals Board pursuant to Regulation 42(5)(d) of the
68 Baumann Eng'g Ltd. V. Kenya Ports Auth., Civ. Case No. 524, 1-2 (High Ct.
2003) (Kenya).
69 Id. at 2-3.
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Regulations and re-tendering was ordered because the tendering
process and the evaluation were found to have been "seriously
flawed."
70
Returning to the illustrative irregular Kenya Ports Authority
tender case, one of the bidders was Numerical Machining Com-
plex, a state corporation under the Ministry of Trade and Indus-
try. 71 This corporation entered into a Memorandum of Under-
standing72 with Industrial Plant Kenya Ltd. ("Industrial Plant"), a
private company, with the intention of presenting a joint bid for
the supply of the cranes, required by the Kenya Ports Authority.
Further, the joint bidders requested and apparently obtained a
bond for their offer from the Ministry of Trade and Industry. This
was an explicit endorsement of the tender by the government and
one that would be difficult to ignore by the tender committee at the
port. The involvement of Numerical Machining Complex in itself
was the subject of controversy. There were reports that a statement
from the board of Numerical Machining Complex -that it had no
capacity to manufacture or in some other way supply the cranes
and had no interest in doing so-was ignored, and the Ministry of
Trade and Industry proceeded to issue an authorization and sup-
port for the joint bid.73 There were at least another twenty-one
bidders involved in this procurement bid from among other places:
Asia, Latin America, Europe, and Japan.74
Beyond this controversy, there was gross interference in the
70 Baumann Eng'g Ltd. v. Kenya Ports Authority, Application No. 18/2003, at
4 (Public Procurement Complaints, Review and Appeals Board May 29, 2003)
(Kenya) (on file with author).
71 Numerical Machining Complex is listed under the direct functions of the
Ministry of Trade and Industry. Functions, Ministry of Trade and Industry, at
http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke/government/trade.htm (last visited Mar. 26,
2004).
72 According to some sources, this memorandum of understanding was never
actually executed. See, e.g., Jaindi Kisero, Government Moves to End Mombasa Port's
Multi-Million Tender Controversy, DAILY NATION, Nov. 11, 2003 (stating that in a
meeting held to discuss the memorandum of understanding and the cranes
supply tender, it was decided that the two issues would be separated and that the
memorandum issue would be addressed on a later date), available at http://
www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/Supplements/bw/11112003/storyll
113.htm.
73 See id. (noting Numerical Machining Complex's resistance at participating
in the joint bid).
74 See Ben Agina, Ministers Challenged on KPA Tender Saga, E. AFR. STANDARD,
Nov. 8, 2003 (discussing the accusations of interference by three cabinet minis-
ters), at http://www.eastandard.net/archives/November/sat8112003/headlines
/news08110314.htm.
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tendering process by the government. The tender opening was
postponed three times on specific requests by cabinet ministers,
with the intention of facilitating receipt of more international bids.
During the third postponement, which occurred only a day before
the actual opening of the bids, the head of the Kenya Ports Author-
ity was under explicit telephone instructions from the Minister for
Transport and Communications not to open the bids. The ostensi-
ble reason was that the process had suffered from a lack of trans-
parency and accountability. 75 However, according to other reports,
the minister requested postponement to allow a bid by an "un-
known interested party." 76 Earlier postponement had also been
made at the prompting of government ministers.77 It should be
noted that the Public Procurement Regulations provide that inter-
national tenders, such as this one for the supply of cranes, have to
be opened within twenty-one days of the close of submissions.
This basic provision was disregarded by the interference of several
cabinet ministers.
When the tenders were finally opened, and despite the lack of
clarity as to whether the board of Numerical Machining Complex
had actually sanctioned its participation in the tendering, the joint
bid by Numerical Machining Complex and Industrial Plant won
the tender. This was an unexpected and questionable result given
that neither company had the capacity to manufacture cranes, or
even to outsource them at a reasonable price. Credibility questions
were raised about both entities. Numerical Machining Complex
was responsible for large financial loss because of a failed project
involving the manufacturing of an authentic Kenyan car, the
"Nyayo Pioneer." Industrial Plant, or its subsidiary, was placed
75 See Jaindi Kisero, Curb Ministers' Appetite for Mischief, DAILY NATION, Nov.
12, 2003 (discussing Transport and Communications Minister John Michulei's in-
struction to postpone the opening of bids), available at http://www.nation
audio.com/News/DailyNation/12112003/Comment/Commentl2ll20036.html.
76 See Agina, supra note 74 (noting that this move led to protests from repre-
sentatives of the other bidders).
77 See Kisero, supra note 75 (noting that the postponing ministers were the
Minister for Economic Planning and the Minister for Trade and Industry). The
third entity that was involved in the second postponement was a company,
known as Triton Petroleum Ltd., that wanted to put in its own bid which was
subsequently received. See David Okwembah, Tender Saga Man Seeks Ex-MPs'
Help, DAILY NATION, Nov. 13, 2003 (quoting information received from the per-
sonal assistant to the head of the Kenya Ports Authority), available at
http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/13112003/News/Newsl3ll2
003136.html.
[Vol. 25:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss2/4
WTO AGREEMENT ON PROCUREMENT
under receivership for non-payment of a bank loan.78 However,
the tender was reopened with Numerical Machining Complex
partnering with a South African consortium instead of Industrial
Plant, and it received explicit backing by the government again on
the basis that "it was government policy to enable Numerical Ma-
chining to participate in lucrative business." 79
3.4. The Kenya Procurement and Public Disposal Bill 2003
As previously noted, Kenya is among the many developing
countries that are currently in the process of either revising their
public procurement legal framework or formulating new laws.
Kenya's Procurement Bill was published on June 24, 2003.80 The
Bill is intended to replace the regulations established in section 5A
of the Exchequer and Audit Act. The Bill has received the ap-
proval of the Cabinet of Ministers and is due for the second read-
ing in parliament. In Parliament, it will go into the committee
stage for close scrutiny. In the meantime, the Ministry of Finance,
which is sponsoring the Bill, has welcomed contributions from the
public and encouraged debate. It convened a national stake-
holders' workshop in November 2003 to discuss the Bill.81 The
principal object of the Bill is to establish procedures for procure-
ment by public entities and the disposal of unserviceable, obsolete
or surplus stores and equipment by such entities.8 2 According to
Section Two, its objectives are: to maximize economy and effi-
ciency; to promote competition and ensure that competitors are
treated fairly; to promote the integrity and fairness of those proce-
dures; to increase transparency in those procedures; and to in-
crease public confidence in those procedures. 83
In Part I, the Bill provides for preliminary matters, including
the objectives as noted above and definitions. It also includes pro-
visions dealing with the application of the Bill and conflicts with
78 See Robert Shaw, Government Must Cancel this Murky Tender, E. AFR.
STANDARD, Nov. 9, 2003, available at http://www.eastandard.net/reports/
rep09110310.htm.
79 See id. (quoting the remarks of Dr. Mukhisa Kituyi, Minister of Trade and
Industry).
80 THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA MINISTRY OF FINANCE, REPORT ON STAKEHOLDERS
WORKSHOP ON THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND DISPOSAL BILL 2003, at 2 (2003) (on
file with author).
81 Id.
82 Procurement Bill, Kenya Gazette Supp. No. 59, pmbl.
83 Id. § 2.
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other acts, international agreements, and conditions on donated
funds. The definition of "procurement" includes the procurement
of "goods, works or services and includes procurement by hir-
ing."84 The definition of "public entity," defined as entities subject
to the Bill, is broad.85 Section Six attempts to address the issue of
possible conflict between the proposed law and international
agreements. It is a curious provision and has been the subject of
debate. It states: "[I]f there is a conflict between this Act, the regu-
lations or any directions of the Authority and an agreement be-
tween the Government and one or more states or multilateral or bi-
lateral intergovernmental organisations, the agreement shall
prevail." The provision makes international agreements superior
to Kenyan law. This immediately leads to questions of national
sovereignty, especially given that under the Kenyan legal system,
international agreements undergo a process of domestication to
become applicable law. The Institute of Economic Affairs, a civil
society group in Kenya, has recommended that this provision,
along with Sections Five and Seven, be expunged from the Bill en-
tirely.86 Noting the anomaly that the Section introduces, one com-
mentator, has remarked:
This clause is problematic .. . [it] raises several problems
and, at least, in one sense casts doubts on the professional
standards of the drafters and their understanding of Ken-
yan law and practice. The main problem is the following.
Kenya's approach to International law is dualist. This
means that a bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral agreement
that Kenya ratifies does not automatically become Kenyan
law until it is, in addition to ratification, passed into law as
an Act of the Kenyan parliament. In other words, interna-
84 Id. § 3(1).
85 According to § 3(1), these definitions include: (a) the Government or any
department of the Government, (b) the courts, (c) the commissions established
under the Constitution, (d) a local authority under the Local Government Act, (e)
a state corporation within the meaning of the State Corporations Act, (f) the Cen-
tral Bank of Kenya established under the Central Bank of Kenya Act, (g) a co-
operative society established under the Co-operative Societies Act, (h) a public
school within the meaning of the Education Act, (i) a public university within the
meaning of the Universities Act, (j) a college or other educational institution main-
tained or assisted out of public funds, or (k) an entity prescribed as a public entity
for the purpose of this paragraph. Id.
86 Memorandum from the Kenya Institute of Economic Affairs, The Public
Procurement and Disposal Bill 2003, at 3-4 (on file with author).
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tional agreements must be domesticated. In effect, any
agreement which has not been converted into an Act of the
Kenyan Parliament is not law in Kenya. Under the Judica-
ture Act of Kenya, international, bilateral or plurilateral
agreement are not sources of law and can therefore not be a
basis for creating obligations or rights nor can courts look
to them to resolve disputes. In this context, what Clause 6
seeks to do is to override Kenyan law with rules that are
not recognised under Kenya's judicial system. This is not
only astonishing, but in fact sets up a rule that is basically
void. The other problem of course is that this is a blanket
provisions and overrides Kenyan law with any and all fu-
ture international, bilateral and plurilateral agreements
which means that if we were to have a procurement agree-
ment at the WTO it would immediately override Kenyan
law even without giving the country any time to adjust pol-
icy and practices and make sure that any potential prob-
lems are looked at and resolved through couching the im-
plementing law in Kenya appropriately. 87
Part II of the Bill creates the institutional structure that will
regulate public procurement. The Public Procurement Oversight
Authority ("Authority") is established as a public corporation. 88
The main functions of the Authority are to ensure that the pro-
curement procedures established under the Bill are complied with,
to monitor the public procurement system, and to assist in the im-
plementation and operation of the system.89 The Authority will be
87 See Sisule Musungu, The Kenya Public Procurement and Disposal Bill,
2003: Comments on the Draft Provisions in the Context of the WTO Discussions
on Transparency in Government Procurement (2003) (unpublished, on file with
author).
88 Procurement Bill, Kenya Gazette Supp. No. 59, § 8(1).
89 Authority shall have the following functions -(a) to ensure that the
procurement procedures established under this Act are complied with;
(b) to monitor the public procurement system and report on the overall
functioning of it in accordance with section 20(3)(b) and present to the
Minister such other reports and recommendations for improvements as
the Director considers advisable; (c) to assist in the implementation and
operation of the public procurement system and in doing so-(i) to pre-
pare and distribute a manual and standard documents to be used in con-
nection with procurement by public entities; (ii) to provide advice and as-
sistance to procuring entities; (iii) to develop, promote and support the
training and professional development of persons involved in procure-
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headed by a director. 90 An advisory board, called the Public Pro-
curement Oversight Advisory Board ("Advisory Board"), is also
established by Section 21. The Advisory Board will consist of five
members appointed by the Minister from persons nominated by
prescribed organizations and the director. The main functions of
the Advisory Board are to give the Authority general advice; to
approve the estimates of the Authority; and to recommend ap-
pointment or termination of the director. A reviewing board is
also provided for.91 The existing Appeals Board will continue as
the Public Procurement Administrative Review Board ("Review
Board"). The composition and membership of the Review Board is
provided in the Exchequer and Audit Act discussed earlier.
92
Part III of the Bill deals with the internal organization of public
entities in relation to procurement. A public entity must establish
procedures for the making of decisions in relation to procure-
ment.93 A public entity must also establish a tender committee,
and other bodies as required under the Regulations. 94 A public en-
tity is responsible for ensuring that the Bill, regulations, and direc-
tions of the Authority are followed.95 The accounting officer is
primarily responsible for ensuring that the public entity fulfills that
ment; and (iv) to issue written directions to public entities with respect to
procurement including the conduct of procurement proceedings and the
dissemination of information on procurements; and (d) to perform such
other functions and duties as are provided for under this Act.
Id. § 9.
90 (1) [T]he Authority shall have a Director who shall be the chief execu-
tive officer of the Authority and who shall be responsible for its direction
and management. (2) The Director shall be a person recommended by
the Advisory Board and approved by the National Assembly. (3) On the
approval of a person by the National Assembly under subsection (2), the
President shall appoint the person as the Director.
Id. § 10.
91 The functions of the Advisory Board are -(a) to advise the Authority
generally on the exercise of its powers and the performance of its func-
tions; (b) to approve the estimates of the revenue and expenditures of the
Authority; (c) to recommend the appointment or termination of the Direc-
tor in accordance with this Act; (d) to perform such other functions and
duties as are provided for under this Act.
Id. § 23.
92 Id. § 25(1)-(3).
93 Id. § 26(2).
94 Id. § 26(3).
95 Id. § 27(1).
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obligation. All other employees are vested with this responsibility
as well, which creates an onus for employees to act as whistle-
blowers. Provision is also made in Article 28 for procuring
agents.96
Part IV sets out the general procurement rules, including rules
about the choice of a procurement procedure. Sections 29(1) and
29(2) require a procuring entity to choose the open tendering or
one of the alternative procedures, such as restricted tendering or
direct procurement under certain conditions. 97 Procurement can
not be split to avoid the use of a procedure.98 The Bill also spells
out a number of rules relating to the conduct of procurement pro-
ceedings including provisions relating to qualifications to be
awarded a contract,99 confidentiality, and communications with the
procuring entity.100 Provisions are included that prohibit induce-
96 Id. § 27(2).
97 See id. § 29(3) ("A procuring entity may use restricted tendering or direct
procurement as an alternative procurement procedure only if, before using that
procedure, the procuring entity-(a) obtains the written approval of its tender
committee; and (b) records in writing the reasons for using the alternative pro-
curement procedure.").
98 Id. § 30.
99 A person is qualified to be awarded a contract for a procurement only
if the person satisfies the following criteria - (a) the person has the neces-
sary qualifications, capability, experience, resources, equipment and fa-
cilities to provide what is being procured; (b) the person has the legal ca-
pacity to enter into a contract for the procurement; (c) the person is not
insolvent, in receivership, bankrupt or in the process of being wound up
and is not the subject of legal proceedings relating to the foregoing; (d)
the procuring entity is not precluded from entering into the contract with
the person under section 33; (e) the person is not debarred from partici-
pating in procurement proceedings under Part IX; (f) such other criteria
as the procuring entity considers appropriate. (2) The procuring entity
may require a person to provide evidence or information to establish that
the criteria under subsection (1) are satisfied. (3) The criteria under sub-
section (1) and any requirements under subsection (2) shall be set out in
the tender documents or the request for proposals or quotations or, if a
procedure is used to pre-qualify persons, in the documents used in that
procedure. (4) The procuring entity shall determine whether a person is
qualified and that determination shall be done using the criteria and re-
quirements set out in the documents or requests described in subsection
(3). (5) The procuring entity may disqualify a person for submitting false,
inaccurate or incomplete information about his qualifications. (6) No per-
son shall be excluded from submitting a tender, proposal or quotation in
procurement proceedings except under this section.
Id. §31.
100 Id.§ 44.
2004]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
ments,101 misrepresentations, 102 collusion, and influence on evalua-
tions by persons not officially involved 03 and conflict of interest. 0 4
Procuring entities are prohibited from entering into procurement
contracts with certain persons, including employees of the procur-
ing entity, public servants, or persons and corporations related to
such employees or public servants. There are also a number of
rules that apply after procurement proceedings have been com-
pleted. These rules include requirements relating to records and
the publication of notice of contracts.105 The amendment of con-
tracts after they have been awarded is also regulated, including in-
terest on a contract's overdue amounts. 06 Provisions are also
made for inspections and audits in relation to both the procuring
entity and the contractor.
10 7
Part V deals with open tendering. Under an open tender, the
procuring entity must prepare an invitation to tender as well as
tender documents. If the value of the procurement is over a pre-
scribed threshold, the invitation must be brought to the attention of
those who may wish to submit tenders by advertisement in news-
papers. 08 Other provisions deal with how much time must be al-
lowed for the submission of tenders, production of copies of tender
documents, and tender security. A number of other provisions re-
late to the tenders themselves, including how they are to be sub-
mitted and received. Particularly, the tenders will be opened by a
tender opening committee subject to specific rules.10 9 Provisions
are made for changes to tenders, clarifications, and corrections of
101 According to section 40(1),
[n]o person seeking a contract for a procurement and no employee or
agent of such a person shall give or offer anything, directly or indirectly,
to an employee or agent of the procuring entity, a member of a board or
committee of the procuring entity or any government official as an in-
ducement relating, in any way, to the procurement.
In the event of inducements, the tenderer shall be disqualified and if the contract
has already been awarded, such a contract shall be voidable at the option of the
procuring entity. Id. § 40(1).
102 Id. § 41.
103 Id. § 42(1)-(2).
104 Id. § 43.
105 Id. §§ 45-46.
106 Id. § 47.
107 Id. § 49.
108 Id.§ 51.
109 See id. § 60 (establishing the rules for the opening of tenders).
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arithmetic errors. Part V also specifies when a tender is responsive
and when it is to be evaluated. For instance, the procuring entity
will be able to extend the validity period of tenders, subject to any
restrictions prescribed in the regulations." 0 Provisions are made
for notification to the person submitting the successful tender and
for entering into the ensuing contract. Consequences are imposed
for a refusal to enter into a contract."' Procuring entities are also
prevented from imposing additional responsibilities as a condition
of being awarded a contract. A provision is also included requir-
ing international tendering if there would not be effective tender-
ing otherwise."
2
Part VI provides for alternative procedures to open tendering.
The first is restricted tendering, which is available if the costs of
open tendering would be disproportionate to the value of the con-
110 See id. § 61 (discussing the rule of extending the tender validity period).
111 According to this section:
(1) If the person submitting the successful tender refuses to enter into a
written contract as required under section 68, the procuring entity shall
notify, under section 67(1), the person who submitted the tender that, ac-
cording to the evaluation under § 66, would have been successful had the
successful tender not been submitted. (2) Section 67(2), section 68 and
this section apply, with necessary modifications, with respect to the ten-
der of the person notified under subsection (1). (3) This section does not
apply if the period during which tenders must remain valid has already
expired.
Id. § 69.
112 This section states:
If there will not be effective competition for a procurement unless foreign
persons participate, the following shall apply - (a) the invitation to ten-
der and the tender documents must be in English; (b) if the procuring en-
tity is required to advertise the invitation to tender under section 54(2),
the procuring entity shall also advertise the invitation to tender in one or
more English-language newspapers or other publications that, together,
have sufficient circulation outside Kenya to allow effective competition
for the procurement; (c) the period of time between the advertisement
under paragraph (b) and the deadline for submitting tenders must be not
less than the minimum period of time prescribed for the purpose of this
paragraph; (d) the technical requirements must, to the extent compatible
with requirements under Kenyan law, be based on international stan-
dards or standards widely used in international trade; (e) a person sub-
mitting a tender may, in quoting prices or providing security, use a cur-
rency that is widely used in international trade and that the tender
documents specifically allow to be used; and (f) any general and specific
conditions to which the contract will be subject must be of a kind gener-
ally used in international trade.
Id. § 71.
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tract and the value of the contract is below the prescribed maxi-
mum. 113 Restricted tendering is also available if there are only a
limited number of suppliers. It is similar to open tendering, except
that the invitation is given only to selected persons. The second is
direct procurement, which is available if there is only one supplier,
if there is an urgent need, or if the procurement is for goods or ser-
vices in addition to those already supplied under another con-
tract.114 In this procedure the procuring entity negotiates directly
with the supplier. The third is the request for proposals, which is
available to procuring services that are advisory or are of a pre-
dominately intellectual nature."5 In this procedure, the procuring
entity invites expressions of interest by advertisements in the press.
The procuring entity determines which people, who express inter-
est are qualified to be invited to submit proposals. The proposals
are evaluated, and the procuring entity negotiates a contract, sub-
ject to set limitations, with the successful applicant. The fourth is
the request for cost quotes, which are available to procure goods
that are readily accessible and for which there is an established
market." 6 In this procedure, the procuring entity prepares a re-
quest for quotes and gives it to selected persons. The successful
quote is the one with the lowest price that meets the requirements.
The fifth is the procedure for low-value procurements, which will
only be available for procurement if the estimated values of the
goods, works, or services are at or below the prescribed maxi-
mum.117 The final alternative procedure is the specially permitted
procurement procedures to be employed in exceptional cases when
the directorate may give special permission to use a procurement
procedure not otherwise available." 8
Part VII provides for the review of procurement proceedings.
A person who submitted a tender, proposal, quotes, or who might
have wished to do so, may request a review by the procuring en-
tity, which once received, initiates the procurement proceedings.19
The decision of the procuring entity is given by the accounting of-
113 Id. § 73.
114 Id. § 75.
115 Id. § 77.
116 Id. § 89.
117 Id. § 91.
118 Id. § 93.
"9 Id. § 94(1).
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ficer. 20 The person who requested the review may request a fur-
ther review by the Review Board.' 21 The Review Board's decision
can be appealed to the High Court.122 Time limits apply for each
step in the review process. 123 Part VIII gives the Authority power
to ensure compliance with the Bill's regulations and directions of
the Authority. The director can order an investigation of procure-
ment proceedings and, after receiving the report, can make an or-
der that gives directions to the procuring entity, cancels the pro-
curement contract, or terminates the proceedings.124 The Review
Board can be requested to review such an order and there is a fur-
ther right of appeal to the High Court.125 Part IX allows the Direc-
tor to debar persons from participating in procurement proceed-
ings for up to two years on specified grounds. 126 A debarred
person can request a review by the Review Board and there is a
further right of appeal to the High Court.127
Part X provides for the disposal of unserviceable, obsolete, or
surplus stores and equipment. A public entity must establish a
committee to recommend a method of disposal to the accounting
120 This section states as follows:
(1) Unless the matter is resolved to the satisfaction of the person who re-
quested the review, the accounting officer of the procuring entity shall
give the decision of the procuring entity within fourteen days after the
procuring entity received the request for the review. (2) The decision
given by the accounting officer shall be in writing and shall set out rea-
sons for the decision and the accounting officer shall ensure that a copy
of the decision is given to the person who requested the review.
Id. § 96.
121 Id. § 97(1)-(4).
122 Id. § 103.
123 Id. §§ 101, 103.
124 Id. §§ 106, 107.
125 Id. §§ 110, 127.
126 This section provides possible grounds for such disbarment as follows:
(1) The Director may debar a person from participating in procurement
proceedings on the ground that the person-(a) has committed an of-
fence under this Act; (b) has committed an offence relating to procure-
ment under any Act; (c) has breached a contract for a procurement by a
public entity; (d) has, in procurement proceedings, given false informa-
tion about his qualifications; or (e) has refused to enter into a written
contract as required under section 68. (2) The Director may also debar a
person from participating in procurement proceedings on a prescribed
ground. (3) A debarment under this section shall be for a period of time,
not exceeding two years, specified by the Director.
Id. § 119.
127 Id. § 127.
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officer in particular cases. 128 The accounting officer is not bound by
the recommendations, but if not accepted, written reasons for the
rejection must be submitted to the committee. 29 Except as allowed
under the regulations, the stores or equipment cannot be disposed
of to an employee. 130 The Authority and the Director have the
power to ensure compliance with Part X as they did under Part
VIII. Special provisions are made for certain procurements and
disposals by the armed forces, police, the Kenya Security Intelli-
gence Service, and the Kenya Prisons Service.131 The Director is re-
quired to convene consultation meetings at least twice a year.132
Part XI concludes with provisions relating to regulations, offences,
transitional matters, and consequential amendments.
4. IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS IN PUBLIC
PROCUREMENT
4.1. The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement
4.1.1. Some Antecedents and Negotiations
The OECD was the earliest forum for discussions of a possible
multilateral framework agreement on government procurement,
and this perhaps explains why the issue has always been perceived
by developing countries as too closely associated with developed-
country interests. The discussions within the OECD began in the
1960s and by 1973 had yielded a Draft Instrument on Government
Purchasing Policies, Procedures and Practices. 33 The early Tokyo
Round GATT draft was based on this OECD draft.34 The GATT
Tokyo Round negotiations, concluding in 1979, resulted in a pluri-
lateral GATT GPA. The GATT GPA had nineteen signatories, who
acceded through a process of negotiations that paralleled the "re-
quest and offer" style.135 By 1994, the number of signatories had
128 Id. § 132.
129 Id. § 133.
130 Id. § 125.
131 Id. § 137.
132 Id. § 138.
133 See DENIS AUDET, OECD, OECD PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REPORT 13, available
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/14/1845927.pdf (last visited Mar. 26,
2004).
134 Id.; see also Choi, supra note 13, at 5 (noting the history of the GPA).
135 Id.; see also Arie Reich, The New GATT Agreement on Government Procure-
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only risen to twenty-three.1 36
Given the very small number of countries that signed the
GATT GPA, its impact on the removal of trade distortive measures
was minimal. Further, the GATT GPA had a minimal coverage
and "minimal impact," 137 since it was limited only to goods actu-
ally procured by central governments, with the services sectors, in-
cluding utilities and transportation, excluded from coverage. Fur-
ther, there was a threshold level of contract value initially pegged
at SDR 150,000 but later lowered to SDR 130,000 following amend-
ments to the agreement in 1988.
The GATT GPA signatories engaged in negotiations for its re-
vision and expansion during the Uruguay Round. However, ac-
cording to Reich, these negotiations were not really part of the
Uruguay Round. 138 Upon conclusion of the negotiations in 1994,
the signatories agreed to sign a new, more expansive but still pluri-
lateral agreement. The new agreement, WTO GPA, was signed at
Marrakech in April, 1994 and entered into force in January, 1996.139
The new agreement broke the limitations of its predecessor and ex-
tended its reach to sub-central government entities such as local
authorities, state governments, and other public bodies such as
corporations and parastatals. However, the agreement is held to
apply only to those entities whose signatories would have been
listed in the commitment. Another significant feature is that the
new agreement includes the procurement of services, which are
usually a major part of government spending, such as construction
services, utilities, and transportation. However, in the case of ser-
vices, only those listed in the agreement are covered. The thresh-
old of coverage remains SDR 130,000 for central governments' pro-
ment: The Pitfalls of Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 125, 126
(1997) (discussing the state of plurilaterism of GATT upon the passage of the
GPA).
136 See Choi, supra note 13, at 5 (detailing how countries became signatories of
the GPA).
137 See Reich, supra note 134 (citing an influential report by the U.S. Account-
ing Office estimating that the total value of government purchases covered by the
Uruguay Round GPA was around US $20 billion annually).
138 Id.
139 For some excellent background information on the agreement and its ne-
gotiation, see LAW AND POLICY IN PUBLIC PURCHASING: THE WTO AGREEMENT ON
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT (Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis eds.,
1997); Patrick A. Messerlin, Agreement on Government Procurement, in OECD
DOCUMENTS: THE NEW WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 65 (1994); Charlene Barshevsky et
al., Developments in EC Procurement Under the 1992 Program, 4 BYU. L. REV. 1269,
1326-36 (1990).
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curement of goods and services, SDR 200,000 for local govern-
ments, and SDR 400,000 for "other entities." Construction con-
tracts are singled out with a threshold of SDR 5,000,000.
4.1.2. Basic Features of the WTO Agreement on Government
Procurement
The WTO GPA has two main features: transparency and non-
discrimination.140 The agreement requires signatories to create a
transparent and openly competitive public procurement system
with clear procedures and award criteria. 141 Procurement agencies
are therefore constrained to publish procurement notices in rea-
sonable time and in an accessible manner for all potentially inter-
ested parties to know and bid,142 and they are to clearly stipulate
any technical specifications, technical qualification procedures, 143
bid opening procedures, 44 and terms and conditions of the con-
tract awards.145 They are also required to indicate if the tendering
process or post-award appeal process is exceptional. 146 They must
keep a record of proceedings, disclose any other information that
may be due to interested parties, and make public the tender
award, including the name and address of the successful bidder
and the value of the winning bid.147 Accordingly, the WTO GPA
aims at opening public procurement contracts "to international
competition under equal commercial conditions free of any na-
140 See Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO GPA],
Annex 4(b) (setting out objectives in the introduction), available at http://
www.wto.org/English/docs-e/legal-e/gpr-94_e.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
141 Id.
142 Id. art. IX. Article IX further requires that the advertisement be in a previ-
ously determined publication and that the notice also be available, at least in
summary form, in one of the three official WTO languages (i.e., English, Spanish
or French). Id.
143 See id. art. VI (setting out technical specifications allowed and disallowed).
144 See id. art. XIII, para. 3 (discussing submission, receipt, and opening of ten-
ders).
145 Id. art. XIII, para 4; see also id. art. VI, para. 2(b) (requiring that any such
technical specifications be based on international standards where such standards
exists). This requirement will ensure that technical specifications are not used to
defeat the non-discrimination element by, for instance, favoring one supplier over
another or by favoring domestic over foreign suppliers.
146 Id. art. XIII, para. 4.
147 Id. art. XVIII. Furthermore, an unsuccessful tenderer is allowed to ask for
information as to why their bid was rejected and about the qualities and advan-
tages of the successful bid. Id.
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tional preferences." 148
The WTO GPA, therefore, requires its signatories to accord na-
tional treatment to all suppliers, meaning discrimination against
products or suppliers from other signatory countries is prohibited.
As a result, the non-discriminatory element in the WTO GPA,
rooted in the maximization of competition, generally ensures that
procuring agencies do not treat suppliers differently because they
may be of different nationality, ownership, affiliation, or origin. In
this regard, preferential prices and offsets are prohibited, as is any
form of favoritism for domestic suppliers. In general, an open and
competitive tendering process of public procurement is encour-
aged with limited tendering allowed for exigencies.
Another important feature of the WTO GPA is that it intro-
duces a "private right of action" for aggrieved and unsuccessful
tenderers to challenge a tender award. Signatories are required to
establish bid-challenge procedures that are "non-discriminatory,
timely, transparent, and effective." 149 This means that the tribunal
established to administer these procedures should be able to award
interim measures for the stay of the tender award pending final de-
termination if it is to be described as timely and effective. This
mandatory provision on bid challenge procedures is particularly
important for two main reasons. The first is that most violations of
the WTO GPA take place at the individual level. For example, an
individual company aggrieved by the tender award of some pro-
curing agency may wish to challenge the award with regard to a
specific contract.
Second, if the tender award is not immediately challenged and
it takes the typically lengthy decision of the WTO, for example, the
outcome may be rendered trivial because the party awarded the
contract could simply go ahead and fulfill their obligations. In
general, WTO dispute settlement remains inter-governmental, and
a private company or individual must approach its government to
lodge a complaint on its behalf. The WTO GPA is innovative as it
mandates signatories to provide a process at the national level
through which violations of the agreement may be redressed, in
addition to the dispute settlement procedures of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding1
50
148 Reich, supra note 135, at 128.
149 WTO GPA, supra note 140, art. XX, para. 2.
150 Id. art. XX. In addition to this opportunity for review at the national level,
Article XXII, paragraph 1 clearly states that "The provisions of the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes under the WTO
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4.1.3. Special and Differential Treatment
Article V is an important derogation from the absolute nature
of the non-discrimination feature of the WTO GPA. If developing
countries can negotiate mutually acceptable exclusions with other
signatories, they are allowed to derogate from the rules on non-
discrimination. Article V is tempered by the financial and devel-
opmental challenges of developing countries. Under the article,
developing countries may obtain special treatment in terms of cov-
erage and national treatment rules by specifying exclusions in the
list of offer. Technical assistance and capacity building is also in-
cluded, as is a dedicated clause for the least developed countries.'51
4.1.4. Whither the Debate on a Multilateral GPA?
The outcome of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference held in
September, 2003 in Mexico confirmed that there was little agree-
ment both on the need for a multilateral framework on govern-
ment procurement, and on the actual parameters of such an agree-
ment. After a period of quiet study of its position following failure
to convince developing countries at Cancun, the European Union's
("EU") position with regard to government procurement and the
other Singapore Issues, is that it "sees no reason to abandon the
fundamental and longrun objective of creating rules" 152 on these
four areas. It would appear that the EU is under no illusions that
an agreement on modalities would be reached. In this regard, the
EU indicates that it will "consider each of the four issues strictly on
its own merits, and no longer insist on each issue being treated
identically if there is no consensus to do sO."153 A look at some of
the discussions in the Working Group on Transparency in
Government Procurement ("WGTGP") reveals that members were
quite divided on almost all the elements under discussion. 5 4 With
Agreement shall be applicable" to disputes arising under the agreement.
151 Id. art. IV.
152 Communication from the Commission to the Council, to the European
Parliament, and to the Economic and Social Committee: Reviving the DDA Nego-
tiations- the EU Perspective, COM(03)734 at 10.
153 Id. at 11.
154 Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement is a multi-
lateral working group within WTO that was set up by the 1996 Ministerial Con-
ference in Singapore. "[The group's] mandate is to study transparency in mem-
bers' government procurement practices, and to develop elements which could be
included in a future agreement on transparency." WTO, Government Procure-
ment: Transparency, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/gproc-e/gp
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the elements of an ideal procurement law framework in mind, the
extent to which WTO members might come up with a framework
that would support the development needs of developing coun-
tries while at the same time providing them with a procurement
system that enables them to control inefficiencies shall be exam-
ined.
4.2. The UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement
The objective of the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Model Law is "to serve as a
model for States for the evaluation and modernization of their pro-
curement laws and practices and the establishment of procurement
legislation where none presently exists." 15 5 The underlying reasons
for the Model Law include the conclusion that most existing na-
tional legislation on procurement "is inadequate or outdated," 56
which results "in inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the procure-
ment process, patterns of abuse, and the failure of the public pur-
chaser to obtain adequate value in return for the expenditure of
public funds."15 7
The need for the Model Law was also premised on the recogni-
tion of the particular need for sound laws and practices in public
sector procurement in the developing world, "where a substantial
portion of all procurement is engaged in by the public sector"'5 8
with much of such procurement being "in connection with projects
that are part of the essential process of economic and social devel-
opment." 15 9 The Model Law was also necessary because "[tlhose
countries in particular suffer from a shortage of public funds to be
used for procurement. It is thus critical that procurement be car-
ried out in the most advantageous way possible. The utility of the
Model Law is enhanced in States whose economic systems are in
transition, since reform of the public procurement system is a cor-
nerstone of the law reforms being undertaken to increase the mar-
tran-e.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
155 See Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of
Goods, U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, at 42, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/403 [hereinafter UNCITRAL Guide], available at http://www.uncitral.
org/English/ texts/procurem/rnlprocur.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
156 Id. at 43.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
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ket orientation of the economy." 160 As another reason, the
UNCITRAL's Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law
on Procurement of Goods ("UNCITRAL Guide") cites the aspira-
tion to eliminate discriminatory government procurement practices
such as non-tariff barriers to trade.
161
Among its k~y provisions, the Model Law recommends tender-
ing "as the rule for normal circumstances in procurement of goods
or construction" 162 because tendering is "widely recognized as
generally most effective in promoting competition, economy, and
efficiency in procurement, as well as the other objectives set forth
in the Preamble." 163 Having recommended tendering as the choice
method of procurement, the Model Law prescribes transparency as
the way to achieve an efficient and beneficial tendering process. In
this regard, it requires that all rules and pieces of legislation rele-
vant to public procurement be made freely accessible to interested
parties and that a record of proceedings in any committees, boards
or any procurement agencies be kept and made available to parties
that may need it.164 According to the UNCITRAL Guide, Article 5
is therefore "intended to promote transparency in the laws, regula-
160 Id.
161 It states in this regard:
Furthermore, the Model Law may help to remedy disadvantages that
stem from the fact that inadequate procurement legislation at the na-
tional level creates obstacles to international trade, a significant amount
of which is linked to procurement. Disparities among and uncertainty
about national legal regimes governing procurement may contribute to
limiting the extent to which Governments can access the competitive
price and quality benefits available through procurement on an interna-
tional basis. At the same time, the ability and willingness of suppliers
and contractors to sell to foreign Governments is hampered by the in-
adequate or divergent state of national procurement legislation in many
countries.
Id. Introduction, para 4.
162 Id. Introduction, para 7.
163 Id.
164 In this way, the rules will:
[facilitate] the exercise of the right of aggrieved suppliers and contractors
to seek review. That in turn will help to ensure that the procurement law
is, to the extent possible, self-policing and self-enforcing. Furthermore,
adequate record requirements in the procurement law will facilitate the
work of Government bodies exercising an audit or control function and
promote the accountability of procuring entities to the public at large as
regards the disbursement of public funds.
Id. art. 11, para. 1.
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tions and other legal texts relating to procurement by requiring
public accessibility to those legal texts." 165 In the same vain, Article
14 of the Model Law requires that procurement awards be publicly
announced.16
6
In addition to transparency, the other key recommendation in
the Model Law is a facility for unsuccessful bidders to challenge or
seek review of the procedure and outcome of a tender award. This
is considered an important policing safeguard and is included in
Chapter VI of the Model Law. This also relates to the fact that the
Model Law abhors any attempts by bidders to influence the out-
come of a tendering process. According to the UNCITRAL Guide,
the intention of Article 15 constitutes an "important safeguard
against corruption: the requirement of rejection of a tender, pro-
posal, offer or quotation if the supplier or contractor in question at-
tempts to improperly influence the procuring entity. " 167 While
recognizing that the effectiveness of such a provision depends on
its implementation, and that generally, having a procurement law
may not completely do away with corruption and other adminis-
trative excesses, Article 15 notes that, "the procedures and safe-
guards in the Model Law are designed to promote transparency
and objectivity in the procurement proceedings and thereby to re-
duce corruption. In addition, the enacting State should have in
place generally an effective system of sanctions against corruption
by government officials, including employees of procuring entities,
and by suppliers and contractors, which would apply also to the
procurement process." 168
The Model Law also tackles the issue of discriminatory prac-
tices in public procurement and the preference for domestically
sourced goods. This has been an important issue in the interna-
tional trade negotiations context and will remain so, should WTO
members enter negotiations for a multilateral agreement on gov-
ernment procurement. In this regard, what the UNCITRAL Model
165 Id. art. 5, para. 1. Affirming the universality of this principle, the UNCIT-
RAL Guide states that it should be found useful even for states that already have
an elaborate administrative law that demands ready public access to legislation.
For these states, "the legislature may consider that a provision in the procurement
law itself would help to focus the attention of both procuring entities and suppli-
ers and contractors on the requirement of adequate public disclosure of legal texts
concerned with procurement procedures."
166 Id. art. 14, para. 1.
167 Id. art. 15, para. 1.
168 Id.
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Law prescribes, including tender examination, evaluation, and
comparison, is quite instructive and could constitute elements of a
multilateral compromise. Even in an extremely open and entirely
competitive tendering process, Article 34 of the Model Law leaves
some flexibility for governments and procuring agencies to incor-
porate criteria other than the lowest bid, in their evaluation of who
to award the tender. It allows the procuring agencies leeway to
award the tender to the "lowest evaluated tender." 169 It should be
stated, and as it is recognized in the UNCITRAL Guide, that tender
price easily provides "the greatest objectivity and predictability." 170
The trickiest part is to decide the criteria used in addition to
price, in arriving at the "lowest evaluated tender." 171 One of the
more plausible rationales proposed by governments for using a
procurement policy allowing discrimination against foreign com-
petition, is the nurturing domestic industry. Article 34, paragraph
(4) (c) (ii) and (iii) have listed the criteria. Recognizing that develop-
ing countries will want to take into account economic development
through sectoral promotion policies in government procurement,
the criteria in paragraph (4)(c)(iii) relates to this economic devel-
opment because "in some countries, particularly developing coun-
tries and countries whose economies are in transition, it is impor-
tant for procuring entities to be able to take into account criteria
that permit the evaluation and comparison of tenders in the con-
text of economic development objectives." 1 72 Also, the Model Law
envisages the possibility that countries may wish to list additional
criteria, but urges caution:
in view of the risk that such other criteria may pose to the
objectives of good procurement practice. Criteria of this
type are sometimes less objective and more discretionary
than those referred to in paragraph (4)(c)(i) and (ii), and
therefore their use in evaluating and comparing tenders
could impair competition and economy in procurement,
and reduce confidence in the procurement process.
173
169 Id. art. 34, para. 4(b).
170 Id. art. 34, para. 3.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
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With the objective of bridling the discretion or arbitrariness in the
formulation of the additional criteria by governments, it is sug-
gested that such criteria should be quantifiable and in the evalua-
tion process, they should be expressed in monetary terms.174 Arti-
cle 34, paragraph (4)(d) and Article 39, paragraph (2) are important
provisions because they allow procuring agencies to grant the
"margin of preference" to domestic tenders. Although the avail-
ability of such a preference is subject to the rules of its calculation
as previously set forth in procurement regulations, and further
subject to a pre-disclosure requirement, it should have been in-
cluded in the documents calling for tender bids, and should also be
reflected in the record of proceedings of the procuring agency. 75
According to UNCITRAL, the margin of preference technique is
beneficial because it,
[p]ermits the procuring entity to select the lowest-priced
tender or, in the case of services, the proposal of a local
supplier or contractor when the difference in price between
that tender or proposal and the overall lowest-priced tender
or proposal falls within the range of the margin of prefer-
ence. It allows the procuring entity to favour local suppli-
ers and contractors that are capable of approaching interna-
tionally competitive prices, and it does so without simply
excluding foreign competition.176
UNCITRAL has an important cautionary remark, that:
174 Id. art. 34, para. 4. In this regard, the UNCITRAL Guide states that one
way of properly using the quantification process is "to quantify in monetary
terms the various aspects of each tender in relation to the criteria set forth in the
solicitation documents and to combine that quantification with the tender price.
The tender resulting in the lowest evaluated price would be regarded as the suc-
cessful tender." Id.
175 The UNCITRAL Guide provides an example of implementing the margin
of preference. It states:
As to the mechanics of applying the margin of preference, this may be
done, for example, by deducting from the tender prices of all tenders im-
port duties and taxes levied in connection with the supply of the goods
or construction, and adding to the resulting tender prices, other than
those that are to benefit from the margin of preference, the amount of the
margin of preference or the actual import duty, whichever is less.
Id. art. 34, para. 6.
176 Id. Introduction, para. 26.
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It is important not to allow total insulation from foreign
competition so as not to perpetuate lower levels of econ-
omy, efficiency and competitiveness of the concerned sec-
tors of national industry. Accordingly, the margin of pref-
erence could be a preferable means of fostering the
competitiveness of local suppliers and contractors, not only
as effective and economic providers for the procurement
needs of the procuring entity, but also as a source of com-
petitive exports .... At the same time, the Model Law rec-
ognizes that enacting States may wish in some cases to re-
strict foreign participation with a view in particular to
protecting certain vital economic sectors of their national
industrial capacity against deleterious effects of unbridled
foreign competition.177
As stated earlier, the Model Law prescribes certain limitations
to the leeway of countries to discriminate against foreign suppliers.
According to Article 8, paragraph 1, any such discrimination must
be on the basis of pre-determined grounds already included in the
country's procurement law. For most developing countries that
are beneficiaries of loan facilities by multilateral lending agencies
such as the World Bank, or even bilateral aid, there are certain
conditionalities that attach to these funds. Some explicitly limit or
eliminate the flexibility of the beneficiary government to discrimi-
nate against foreign tenderers. Article 3 of the Model Law recog-
nizes the "the primacy of international obligations of the enacting
State" and that often, the bilateral or other loan arrangements
"would require that procurement with the funds should be from
suppliers and contractors in the donor country." 178
4.3. The COMESA Transparency in Government Initiative
It is essential that laws, regulations and procurement policies
be harmonized if COMESA is to effectively realize its objective of
deeper regional integration. 179 Owing to the obvious linkages be-
177 Id.
178 Id. art. 25. The Model Law also allows restrictions on the basis of national-
ity that may result from regional economic integration groupings that accord na-
tional treatment to suppliers and contractors from other States' regional economic
groupings, as well as to restrictions arising from economic sanctions imposed by
the United Nations Security Council. Id.
179 See Karangizi, supra note 27, at 2 (noting that the Common Market for
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tween government procurement, regional free trade and develop-
ment, and following "requests by member states that the public
procurement practices in some of the member states was a deter-
rent to increased trade in the COMESA region,"s 0 COMESA has
taken a keen interest in issues of government procurement in the
region. 81 Its objectives in this regard are premised on provisions
of the COMESA Treaty, Articles 3(c), 1 8 2 4(6)(b),183 and 55.184
In a meeting of the COMESA Council of Ministers held in Kin-
shasa in June 1998, it was decided that "the Secretariat embarks on
a comprehensive study of the procurement rules and practices" 185
in the region with the view "to attain their harmonisation." 18 6 The
project received funding support from the African Development
Bank and is due for completion in April, 2004.187 The overall aim
Eastern and South Africa's ("COMESA") interest in public procurement reform
was part of its wider strategy of having a cohesive regional competition policy).
180 Id.
181 See The Fifteenth Meeting of the Council of Ministers, COMESA (Mar. 2003)
(discussing public procurement reform in COMESA), available at http://
www.comesa.int (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
182 Article 3 outlines the aims and objectives of COMESA, including the de-
sire to cooperate in the creation of an enabling environment for investment. The
"enabling environment" in this regard would definitely include an open and
transparent government procuring system. Treaty of the Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa, Dec. 8, 1994, art. 3 [hereinafter COMESA Treaty],
available at http://www.comesa.int. For an excellent summary of the COMESA
history and objectives, please see Stephen Karangizi, Customs Enforcement in a Re-
gional Integration Arrangement: The Case of COMESA, in TREATY ENFORCEMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATrERS 322-30 (Rodrigo Yepes-
Enriquez & Lisa Tabassi eds., 2002).
183 Article 4, paragraph 6(b) of the COMESA Treaty provides for the har-
monization of laws throughout the COMESA region. COMESA Treaty, supra note
182, art. 4, para. 6(b). This should make for an open and predictable system of ob-
ligations on the part of businessmen in the region. Id.
184 Article 55 is a more general provision in which all COMESA member
states agree not to take any actions or put in place any measures that defeat the
objectives of free trade. Id. art. 55.
185 Id.; see also Karangizi, supra note 27, at 3 (recognizing the importance of
harmonizing procurement policies).
186 Id.
187 The Fifteenth Meeting of the COMESA Council of Ministers states as fol-
lows:
The representative of African Development Bank made a statement. He
congratulated the Government of Sudan and COMESA Secretariat for
the successful arrangements made for the meetings. He pointed out that
COMESA was an important building block to the African Union and was
glad that it was making great strides in achieving vision (sic) on African
integration. He pointed out that ADB maintains very close cooperation
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of the project was to "lay the groundwork for ensuring account-
ability and transparency, combating corruption, and creating an
enabling legal infrastructure in public procurement" 18 8 in the re-
gion. More particularly, the project envisaged a legal reform com-
ponent, with the evolution of a set of model laws, regulations, and
procedures "rooted on the principles of good governance," 189 the
creation of a Procurement Technical Committee of Heads of Na-
tional Procurement Agencies, and the formulation of Procurement
Directives by February, 2003.190 The evolution of a regional trans-
parency in government procurement campaign should be a wel-
come initiative. More particularly, if well managed and financed,
it is likely to yield a regionally cohesive procurement legislative
framework. According to the COMESA Council decision, "a con-
solidated approach to public procurement reform would help to
prevent unnecessary divergences between the procedures applica-
ble to different types of procurement and to ensure that a single
high standard of economy and efficiency, competition, transpar-
ency and fairness applies throughout the procurement system."191
Citing some of the benefits of a regional approach to reform of the
legal framework on government procurement, the Council noted
that "[clonsolidation and harmonisation of the legal framework
also renders procurement systems more user-friendly, both to the
concerned public officials and to the private sector. Such consid-
eration assumes added importance in the context of regional inte-
gration of procurement markets."192 In light of this, the Council
with COMESA, which was sealed in 1999 when the two organisations
signed a cooperation agreement. ADB has so far provided funding total-
ling about US $4.6 million to COMESA. Council noted that the ADB current
direct support to COMESA was US $1.5 million grant for public procurement
reforms. Council also noted that ADB was considering some COMESA
pipeline projects including an agriculture trade project and seminar for
COMESA staff.
The Fifteenth Meeting of the Council of Ministers, supra note 181, para. 322 (emphasis
added).
188 Karangizi, supra note 27, at 3.
189 Id. at 6.
190 See Yacine Fal, Public Procurement Reform: The Role of the ADB, Presen-
tation at the Joint WTO-World Bank Regional Workshop on Procurement Re-
forms and Transparency in Public Procurement for English Speaking African
Countries (Jan. 14-17, 2003) (describing the components of the COMESA Public
Prourement Reform), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/gproc-e
/wkshop_ tanz_jan03/falle.ppt#1 (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
191 The Fifteenth Meeting of the Council of Ministers, supra note 181, para. 85.
192 Id.
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proceeded to endorse a decision reached in an earlier regional
meeting of Ministers of Justice and Attorneys-General, which had
decided that public procurement reform in the COMESA region
would be attained through four main strategies: the adoption of
modern national legislation on public procurement for countries
that did not have such legislation or the revision and improvement
of national legislation for countries with outdated legislation;
193
"the adoption of the principles and essential components of na-
tional legal frameworks as contained in Document No.
COM/IC/XV/3(a) for supporting the project on public procure-
ment reform in COMESA and enhancing regional integration;" 194
' the establishment of a technical committee on public procure-
ment" as highlighted earlier;195 and "the adoption of the institu-
tional and organizational arrangements contained in document
COM/IC/XV/3(a)."196
5. CONCLUSION
There is an ongoing wave of reform of public procurement
laws and policies around the world. In Africa, these reforms are
conducted at the national and regional levels. At the national level,
the discussion has focused on Kenya. Additional examples would
include the East African countries of Uganda, Tanzania,197 Guinea
Bissau, 198 and Gambia. 199 At the regional level, this Article has
highlighted the ongoing COMESA public procurement initiative
that aims to harmonize public procurement laws and policies
throughout the region. There are other examples of regional
strategies including the Maghreb harmonization efforts involving
Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia, and supported
193 Id. para. 86.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 See ODHIAMBO & KAMAU, supra note 32 (noting Tanzania laws and regula-
tions recently passed by Parliament addressing public procurement).
198 According to Wittig, new regulations are being formulated with national
and international stakeholders in Guinea Bissau. It is intended that "[a] new cen-
tral procurement office will develop policies, training programs, oversee selected
contract award decisions, and install management information systems." See
Wittig, supra note 20, at 9.
199 In the Gambia, the intended changes are supposed to yield a new "legal
framework, organizational infra-structure and training programs affecting public
procurement." Id.
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by the Geneva-based International Trade Centre.200 All these re-
forms efforts will lead to a fairly open public procurement system
in most of the developing world. These resultant public procure-
ment systems seem to converge quite comfortably with respect to
the basic design principles of efficiency, non-discrimination, and
transparency. Regarding transparency, it may closely resemble the
requirement of WTO GPA and what has so far crystallized from
the discussions in the WGTGP. Hopefully, developing countries
should then find it less costly to become signatories to the WTO
GPA and in the process avail themselves of a lock-in facility for
their reform gains through adherence to the multilateral process.
This is crucial in particular for African countries where weak or de-
liberately lax enforcement of laws and policies allow some gov-
ernment officials to compromise the effectiveness and integrity of
the public procurement process. Although it may be deemed un-
desirably intrusive, developing countries that have unique chal-
lenges, particularly those in Africa, should consider becoming sig-
natories to the WTO GPA and should engage in a thorough cost-
benefit analysis of the agreement.
200 This exercise will involve "harmoni[z]ing the legal frameworks, financing
mechanisms, electronic procurement systems and a comprehensive training pro-
gramme." Id.
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